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Revisiting Privacy and Dignity:  
Online Shaming in the Global E-Village  
 
 
To many of us, using shaming as a form of criminal sanction is intuitively 
barbaric.
1
 Professor James Whitman explains this as society showing its contempt or 
disgust towards individual wrongdoing by subjecting the perpetrator to a form of 
peculiar vulnerability, which can deprive him or her of dignity and personhood.
2
 
Although most countries no longer use it in cases of the convicted, there seems to be a 
revival, on the Internet, of a form of ‘shaming’ acting as a method of social sanction.  
This new form of shaming involves the exposure of acts that take place in public 
through wide Internet dissemination without consent. It is followed by a call for the 
identification of the transgressor by anonymous netizens, with further divulgence of 
the targeted individuals’ personal identifiable information: this, for the purpose of 
humiliation, social condemnation and punishment against those who have 
transgressed social norms. Such behaviour easily escalates into a form of online mob 
trial, or of real life harassment. Hence, the individuals who transgressed and violated 
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social norms in the first place have now themselves become transgressor-victims. As a 
result, one must question who are the perpetrators here when such people are 
mercilessly tracked and ridiculed together with wide exposure to intimate 
embarrassing information. In such circumstances, the empowering nature of the 
Internet can become tyrannical as we witness blatant forms of online shaming in 
which individuals are able to invade the privacy of others in the name of freedom of 
expression.   
Elsewhere, I have explained why common law understanding of privacy is 
inadequate to deal with the variety of infringements on the internet.
3
 This is mainly 
because the right to privacy is dependent on the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ of 
those in the like position of the claimants,
4
  but is open to subjective interpretation and 
difficult to apply. Furthermore, when objectionable acts take place in the plain view of 
the public, the claimants’ expectation is arguably lower. Even more difficult is the fact 
that the claimants themselves are at fault if they are violating social norms, thus 
apparently justifying a tilting of the balance in favour of freedom of expression. In 
other words, are social villains still able to claim protection to privacy rights? 
In order to answer this question, we need to understand the underlying value of 
privacy and its relationship to dignity with particular relevance to the debate on online 
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shaming. Drawing on emerging jurisprudence from the European Court of Human 
Rights regarding the right to private life and its relation to one’s reputation and 
dignity,
5
 I argue that dignity should be recognized as part and parcel of privacy right, 
which  should not be compromised easily regardless of whether one is at fault or not.
6
 
What we should also bear in mind is that this concept of dignity is an intrinsic value 
in each human being which must allow for freedom from humiliation and the 
development of physical and psychological integrity. In this sense, therefore, dignity 
is inherent whereas issues of reputation and honour are conferred through estimation 
in the minds of society. 
  In what follows, there is a detailed discussion concerning the concept of 
‘shame’: firstly, why does civilized society not use shame sanctions from a socio-legal 
perspective for protection of dignity, and against the dehumanizing effect on society 
as a whole. In the case of online shaming, there will be examples in this part. 
Although one may find that shame sanctions are objectionable, society needs a legal 
basis to prohibit such behaviour and give recognition to the value of dignity. Secondly, 
this article will outline various international legal instruments related to the concept of 
dignity and its close connection with the right to privacy. However, it becomes 
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evident that in the English courts, the judicial interpretation of both dignity and 
privacy is in a nebulous state. In contrast, the rulings from the European Court of 
Human Rights on the meanings of reputation, honour, dignity and privacy have given 
us new insight, but the doctrine on dignity is not yet settled. The final part will 
address the issue of why the right to private life, including the aspect of dignity, 
should never be compromised in the face of so-called freedom of expression in online 
shaming. The exposure of truth in cases of wrongdoing does not justify the 
unrestrained disclosure of personal information, particularly in cases where one’s 
physical security and psychological health could be severely threatened. What is 
needed, therefore, is the recognition and protection of the dignity and privacy of the 
individual in order to arrive at norms and values inherent in decent participation in the 
e-village. 
 
 
I. Shaming, Punishment and Social Sanctions 
Shame is a highly complex, intriguing and nuanced concept. Toni Massaro, in 
her influential work on shame, points out that it covers a vast emotional terrain of 
shyness, defeat, alienation and guilt,
7
 while at the same time, stretching into the 
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normative realm in condemning the defeated self who has failed to reach an expected 
standard imposed either by society or by oneself.
8
 It is closely linked to the awareness 
of inadequacy, strangeness, limitation and defeat.
9
 In other words, shame is 
simultaneously an emotion, and a norm (condemning what is shameful). In an equally 
important work of scholarship on shame, Bernard Williams examines Homeric Greek 
shame culture and its relevance to contemporary time. He argues that shame has both 
internal personal and external societal dimensions that are closely intertwined.
10
 For 
Williams, the experience of shame is ‘being seen, inappropriately, by the wrong 
people, in the wrong condition.’11  But he also notes that shame does not merely 
operate at the level of being actually seen. A large part of it operates by conjuring up 
fear, in the anticipation of what others will think of one self, on the level of principle 
that one has failed.
12
 The gaze is powerful because it has been internalized and the 
whole self is thus focused and evaluated by a prospective normative standard of how 
one will be admired, accepted or despised by a community with a certain view. 
Consequently, the experience of shame in both senses and the reaction to it will make 
one’s whole self seems diminished or lessened, thereby prompting a desire to 
disappear, to cover oneself and to hide. 
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In the writings of both Massaro and Williams, shame is related to one’s 
perception of self-worth, that is to say, self-esteem with a close affiliation to dignity,
13
 
a concept which will be later explained in the next section. While writing on official 
shaming or shame penalties other than explaining why official shaming will not be 
effective to achieve the aim of deterrence from a psychological perspective, Massaro 
has highlighted the key features of official public shaming as a call for public 
humiliation, an expression of disgust and contempt towards the offender by the public 
and a crude form of boundary-drawing to ostracize the offender from the 
community.
14
 In other words, although what is central to ‘shame’ is a sense of self- 
awareness or self-consciousness, ‘shaming’ is essentially about directing community 
disapproval and hostility against an individual. 
Different societies, such as Victorian England, colonial America, and pre-World 
War II Japan had state sanctioned shaming penalties.
15
  In the aftermath of Maoist 
China, public trials and sentencing rallies have also been prominently used.
16
 In 
modern times, we continue to witness attempts to bring back this practice by agents of 
the state.   For example, in 2006, Judge James Kimbler from Ohio, in the US, posted 
videos of sentencing hearings on YouTube to shame the criminals and to educate the 
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public.
17
 Again between 2000 and 2009, the media in Wellington, New Zealand, 
published the names of all convicted drink drivers in the region as part of a policy of 
‘naming and shaming’ with state approval and endorsement.18 Since April 2011, the 
Dongguan Court of Guangdong province, China, has been uploading photos of 
defendants who have defaulted or refused to pay damages in civil actions onto Sina 
microblogs.
19
 Those photos often show the defendants being arrested or in handcuffs. 
However, with the Internet and other information communication technologies, 
we no longer need to rely on state approval for shaming or on state laws to indicate 
which act should be condemned. For instance, in China, the Internet is being used as a 
‘human flesh search engine’20 in order to expose individuals who have transgressed 
social norms.  These include exposing the identity of an unfaithful husband,
21
 of a 
kitten torturer,
22
 and of a university student regarded as a traitor for showing 
sympathy to the Tibetan independent movement.
23
 In another Korean case, a 
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university student who refused to clean up the faeces of her dog in a subway train 
compartment was labeled as the Dog Poop Girl and her story was reported widely 
(including The Washington Post).
24
 It was covered both in an academic book
25
 and 
circulated in the Internet.
26
 In the US, another female university student’s identity was 
revealed without her consent after she had posted an ode in the social network site 
‘My Space’ expressing her disdain for the town community in which she had grown 
up.
27
 Because of this, not only was she harshly criticized, but also her family faced 
death threats and were eventually forced to relocate.
28
 As we can see, therefore, the 
trend of using easy means to expose others’ deeds via the internet can cause 
unexpected responses to say the least and uproar at most. Again, this is well illustrated 
in Clay Shirky’s accounts of the ‘StolenSidekick’ story.  This concerns a woman’s 
attempt to get back a mobile phone which she had accidentally left in a New York cab. 
It was picked up by a teenage girl who refused to return it. Through successfully 
mobilizing all the social connections of the phone owner on the Internet, the personal 
information of the teenage girl and her family was exposed on the Internet. Eventually, 
she was arrested by the police.
29
 This story was covered in the New York Times, CNN, 
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over 60 newspapers, the radio, and more than 200 weblogs.
30
  
In all these stories of so-called ‘human endeavour’31 in the name of righting of 
wrongs, the public feels a strong sense to condemn the actions of the violators and to 
shame them by ‘showcasing social transgressions on websites.’32 Whether we are 
referring to state sanctioned shame penalties or online shaming, these punishments are 
highly objectionable because they encourage citizens to resort to dehumanizing and 
brutalizing behaviour towards the offender or the social delinquent.
33
 The latter is 
displayed as a labelled and defined object exposed to the public sphere in either the 
real or cyber world. The public is then enlisted to humiliate, ridicule and punish 
him/her all over again. As related in the earlier cases, the inevitable consequence is 
ex-communication of the ‘social untouchable.’34 For example: the Dog Poop Girl in 
Korea withdrew from her University; the Kitten Torturer in China, who was a 
pharmacist, was dismissed by her hospital; and the American university student was 
forced to relocate following criticism of her home town.  
       In his work on shaming penalties, Whitman considers that the entire process of 
stirring up a mixture of public indignation and public merriment,
35
 and inciting hatred, 
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is akin to public spitting.
36
 But what he finds the most objectionable is the arbitrary 
display of force which turns the victim into a ‘plaything,’37 making him aware of 
societal disgust toward him. In other words, the message is that the violator is less 
than human and deserves our contempt.
38
 This is why Whitman argues so forcefully 
that this is violation of individual dignity which runs ‘contrary to some deep norm 
requiring us to treat even criminals with respect.’39 The state authorities, therefore, 
should only deprive offenders of property and liberty alone.
40
 Furthermore, Whitman 
advocates a call for ‘transactional dignity,’ by which he means that citizens should 
never be forced to deal with wild or unpredictable responses from other fellow 
citizens.
41
 This is tantamount to a form of ‘lynch justice’ subjecting an individual to 
the public exercise of enforcement of power,
42
 and it breaches our commitment to 
maintain decent social institutions which do not humiliate people.
43
 Whitman’s 
critique is equally applicable and valid to online shaming. 
 
II. In Search of a Legal Right: Dignity and Privacy 
Convinced as we may be by arguments, any serious effort to prohibit or regulate 
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online shaming has to be anchored in legal principles. Massaro and Whitman may 
well have argued persuasively for a halt to public humiliation but the real challenge to 
be faced is to explain why the law must recognise and legally protect the need for 
dignity and why such dignity should prevail over the right of freedom of expression in 
the case of online shaming. Thus, I will argue that this concept of dignity should be 
embedded in the protection of privacy rights as part and parcel of one’s personhood 
and integrity.  Above all, it should not be conflated with the notion of dignity as mere 
reputation.  
 
A. The Legal Concept of Dignity  
Dignity as a legal principle or right has been enshrined in numerous international 
treaties. For instance, the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) mentions the principle of dignity twice,
44
 and Article 1 stipulates that ‘all 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.’ Likewise, the Preamble 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states that ‘the inherent dignity… 
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of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace of 
the world…recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the 
human person.
45
 Also, other local, regional and international legal documents that 
have recognized dignity as a core human rights principle or right have been neatly 
summarized by Christopher McCrudden.
46
 The scope of such protection ranges from 
autonomy, equality, protection from degrading treatment to protection of group 
identity and culture. Despite this lack of an ‘agreed content’, there are two important 
lessons that we can draw from McCrudden’s detailed study of international legal 
documents and judicial interpretation on dignity.  
First, after examining the historical development of the concept of dignity, 
McCrudden reminds us that dignity as a question of  status, honour and respect  
differs entirely from the notion of the natural dignity inherent in any human being and 
is not, therefore,  dependent on any particular additional status or achievement.
47
 The 
former is tied to a person’s worth as judged in accordance to the estimation of others 
and their place in society, which is characterized as ‘prosaic dignity’ by another 
scholar.
48
 In contrast, the latter refers to the intrinsic existential worth and value of the 
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individual human being.  In the words of other scholars, it is a form of ‘fundamental 
dignity,’ 49  a kind of ‘interpersonal respect,’ 50  and a principle of ‘inviolate 
personality.’ 51  The distinction between these two understandings of dignity is 
particularly pertinent to our debate on online shaming because many may not feel 
sympathetic to the transgressor-victims. After all, they have breached the social norms 
in society, and have contributed to their own misery. Thus many may perceive that the 
protection of  reputation  under defamation law (which is based on falsity) are non-
issues in that the notion of dignity as part of a right per se might be seen as rendering 
the culpability of the transgressor irrelevant. Nevertheless, in spite of wrongful or 
unlawful deeds, Reaume would argue that no one deserves to be mocked, degraded, 
humiliated or toyed with.
52
  
In sum, therefore, McCrudden  points to three elements as the basis for core 
dignity: (i) every human being possesses an intrinsic worth, merely by being human; 
(ii) this intrinsic worth should be recognized and respected by others, meaning that 
dignity has a relational claim on how one should be treated; and (iii)  the intrinsic 
worth of the individual requires the state to recognise that it exists for the sake of the 
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individual and not vice versa.
53
 
While McCrudden analyses various cases, it is to the specific association of 
dignity with freedom from humiliation to which he refers, in particular, ‘where 
restrictions are placed on the publication of information or data that would lead to a 
person being pilloried.’54 This understanding of dignity also explains why torture, 
inhuman, degrading or ill-treatment against war criminals should be prohibited. 
Quoting Ireland v. United Kingdom, McCrudden draws our attention to the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) interpretation of degrading treatment, which is 
prohibited under Article 3 of the European Convention, defined as treatment ‘intended 
to denote something seriously humiliating, lowering as to human dignity, or 
disparaging, like having one’s head shaved, being tarred and feathered, smeared with 
filth, pelted with muck, paraded naked in front of strangers, forced to eat excreta…or 
dress up in a way calculated to provoke ridicule or contempt…’55 In addition, relying 
on Pretty v United Kingdom, the European Court rules obiter that where treatment 
‘humiliates or debases an individual showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his 
or her human dignity or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of 
breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterized as 
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degrading.’56 Here it is important to note that the kind of treatment that would qualify 
as degrading has to reach an intense degree, involving exceptional, life-threatening 
conditions.
57
 In L v. Lithuania, the applicant faced embarrassment, humiliation, severe 
hostility and taunts in daily life for being a transsexual who was unable to go through 
complete gender-reassignment surgery due to the lack of legal regulation on the 
matter in Lithuania.
58
 Facing unbearable social ostracism, he brought an action before 
the ECtHR, arguing that the state had subjected him to degrading treatment and had 
violated his privacy rights. Nevertheless, the European Court held that the degree of 
severity for degrading treatment that he had to face had not reached the legal level 
required under Article 3. However, it ruled that there was violation of privacy right 
under article 8 because respect for private life includes the respect for human dignity 
and the quality of life.
59
 Applying this to our discussion, though the state may yet not 
be a party in administering online shaming, arguably, it will have a positive obligation 
to prohibit such an act under the doctrine of horizontal effect.
60
  
When the protection of dignity is based on the noble ideal of respect for each 
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human being, whether of achievement or wrongdoing equally, its scope necessarily 
becomes diverse and broad. For the present, therefore, I will concentrate on the role of 
dignity in informing the development of privacy right in cases influenced by the 
ECtHR jurisprudence in the English court and the ECtHR itself where the value of 
dignity has played a distinctive role especially in the context where the plaintiffs 
could be said to be partly at fault as transgressor-victims. Although the English court 
uses the term ‘privacy’ while the ECtHR adopts more commonly ‘the right to private 
life,’ I will use those terms interchangeably.  
 
B.  Dignity and Privacy under English Common Law: The Right of ‘Liars’ 
English common law does not recognize a separate cause of action for 
infringement of dignity, and has also been slow in recognizing a full right of privacy.
61
 
It was not until 2004 that the House of Lords of the United Kingdom breathed new air 
into this area in the landmark case of Campbell v. MGN Ltd,
62
 a case concerning the 
world renowned supermodel, Naomi Campbell whose photos were taken in a public 
street at a moment when she was leaving a Narcotics Anonymous clinic. The photos 
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were then published by a tabloid newspaper, the Daily Mirror. While Campbell 
conceded that since she had misled the public before, the Daily Mirror was entitled to 
publish that she was an addict, she objected to publication of any further details.  The 
defence counsel for the paper argued that since the act took place in public and any 
members of the public passing by at that particular moment would have easily noticed 
it was Campbell. Any claim based on privacy violations should, therefore, be defeated. 
The case was plagued with difficulties because Campbell was a public figure who 
maintained that she had not succumbed to the habit of taking drugs before and the 
photos were taken in an unobtrusive manner on a pavement.  
 Though the Court was split in reaching its decision in favour of Campbell, all 
five judges agreed that English law recognizes the right to protection of private 
information. In the words of Lord Nicholls, the essence of the tort is better 
encapsulated as misuse of private information.
63
  The judges noted at the time that the 
European Convention of Human Rights had been incorporated into the local law of 
the United Kingdom and the court, therefore, has an obligation to respect private 
life.
64
 The House of Lords’ famous ratio indicates that ‘[t]he touchstone… is whether 
in respect of the disclosed facts the person in question had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.’65 However, the exact legal basis for this right remains controversial. 
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65
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 Ironically, it was Lord Hoffmann, one of the dissenting judges, who was the 
only one to discuss the relationship between respect for dignity and privacy, but he 
decided to rule against Campbell. In his judgment, Lord Hoffmann often used the 
term autonomy and dignity together.
66
 He ruled that ‘[w]hat human rights law has 
done is to identify private information as something worth protecting as an aspect of 
human autonomy and dignity.’67  To him, this protection consists of ‘the right to 
control the dissemination of information about one’s private life and the right to the 
esteem and respect of other people.’68 Although he considered one’s state of health to 
be part of human autonomy and dignity and any unauthorized disclosure constituted a 
plain and obvious violation of the citizen’s autonomy, dignity and self-esteem,69 he 
concluded there was sufficient public interest to override this right because Campbell 
had lied in this regard before.
70
 While he considered the widespread publication of a 
photograph of someone in a situation of humiliation or severe embarrassment, making 
a direct reference to the judgement of Peck v United Kingdom,  to be an infringement 
of one’s privacy and an affront to one’s personality,71 he ruled that there was nothing 
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embarrassing about the printed photos of Campbell by narrowly focusing on the fact 
that the photos had only revealed Campbell neatly dressed and smiling.
72
 By doing so, 
he had ignored the entire context in that Campbell was attending a Narcotics 
Anonymous therapy meeting.  
 From the above perspective, Lord Hoffmann’s interpretation of dignity and 
privacy has, in fact, treated dignity to be on par with one’s honour and reputation as 
perceived by the world. It would be lost, however, if one had lied, thereby proving 
Campbell to be unworthy of such protection. As discussed above, this is only the first 
aspect of dignity in the prosaic sense. In contrast, the majority of the judges found that 
the disclosed information concerning Campbell was obviously of a private nature 
since it was about an individual seeking medical therapy. In addition, the court also 
noted the distress and the psychological and emotional harm that would be caused to a 
drug addict if her sense of security and respect were threatened at that very critical 
time of treatment.
73
 The fact that Campbell had lied was peripheral in the Court’s 
opinion and the media’s desire to set the record straight had to be subordinated to the 
interest of her private life.
74
 Indeed, the outcome of the case is laudable. Arguably, the 
majority judgment is closer to the spirit of respecting one’s right of innate dignity 
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since it is about protecting one’s self-esteem and feelings from being intruded or 
assaulted by the public. The essence of preventing misuse of information in Campbell 
is not about protecting truth or correcting falsity; what is unfortunate is that the Court 
had simply stated that certain kinds of information, including information about health, 
personal relationships or finance, are clearly private while the protection of other 
types of information would be dependent on one’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Without delineating the underlying rationale for privacy protection, this approach is 
unsatisfactory. Not only has it created uncertainty for future claimants whose 
information fails to fall within the established recognized protected categories of 
information, the subsequent award of remedies to compensate for injured feelings 
from psychiatric or psychological harm considered by the Court also needs to be 
grounded in legal principles.
75
  
If revealing a lie concerning one’s painful dependence on drugs has failed to 
convince all the law lords of the importance of privacy right and its relation to one’s 
innate dignity, how does this compare with the case of the unenviable position of Max 
Mosley, the President of  Formula 1?  In 2008, unauthorized photos were published 
which showed him indulging in sado-masochistic activities with five dominatrix 
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prostitutes.
76
 Other than covering the story with photos in its printed version, the 
News of the World had published video footage on its online website. The allegations 
alluded to Nazi overtones of concentration camp role-play which was ruled to be 
unfounded by Justice Eady from the High Court. At this point, it is relevant to give a 
brief background of Mosley which is helpful for us in understanding the controversy 
of the case. Max Mosley is the son of Oswald Mosley, who founded the British Union 
of Fascists in the 1930s and had close ties to Hitler.
77
  Mosley and his family were 
interned in 1940 soon after World War II had broken out. In public, Max Mosley had 
always shown strong disapproval of Nazi belief and practice.
78
  Against this 
background, the tabloid news had a field day -  in effect, accusing Mosley of being a 
sexual pervert and a hypocrite. Understandably, Mosley was outraged and brought an 
action for breach of confidence and invasion of right to private life under article 8 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights. Although the English High Court sided 
with Mosley, the support was not unreserved. As the analysis of the judgment will 
show below, its interpretation on privacy and dignity seems to have suggested that 
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Mosley himself should be held partly responsible, if not in law, at least for his own 
‘misfortune’ and downfall.79  
It is well-known that News of the World is a tabloid publication so the headline 
they chose to cover the Mosley story was not only ‘saucy’ but with heavy moral 
overtone. It read - ‘FORMULA One motor racing chief Max Mosley is today exposed 
as secret sado-masochist sex pervert,’80 with a sub-heading ‘SHAME’ to follow.81 It 
labelled Mosley as a liar,
82
 and its defence counsel described his activities as 
‘immoral, depraved and to an extent adulterous.’83 Thus, in the public sphere and in 
the court room, News of the World played the role of a moral crusader in condemning 
a public figure for disrespectful and deceitful behaviour. Its whole legal defence 
rested on the fact that freedom of expression should prevail over privacy rights 
because there was public interest in exposing ‘lies,’ including private sexual behaviour.  
 Eady J made it clear, at the outset of the judgment, that the action was not 
‘directly concerned with any injury to reputation’ because it was not a claim in 
defamation.
84
 He further pointed out that sexual activity is inherently private and the 
law protecting private life is there precisely to prevent the violation of a citizen’s 
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autonomy, dignity and self-esteem.
85
 By their nature, photographs and visual images 
are particularly intrusive as a means of invading privacy since they ‘enable the person 
viewing the photograph to act as a spectator.’86 In the particular context, Justice Eady 
elaborated that sexual activity in private places between consenting adults 
indisputably engages the rights of private life under article 8 of the European 
Convention for it is ‘an essentially private materialisation of the human personality.’87 
He made it very clear that despite the fact that the relationship may have been 
adulterous, or was perceived to be ‘unconventional or perverted’, it did not mean one 
would lose the right to privacy.
88
 Justice Eady pushed it even further in ruling that 
even for those who have committed serious crimes, it does not necessarily mean that 
they would become the ‘outlaws’ of privacy protection.89 He then cited the specific 
example of Campbell’s illegal behaviour of drug usage which had not barred the 
House of Lords in recognizing her privacy right,
90
 before concluding that the fact that 
Mosley might have violated the Sexual Offences Act in paying for sexual services was 
irrelevant to privacy protection.
91
 
It is of particular relevance to our discussion on dignity that when Justice Eady 
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acknowledged that privacy rights are there to protect one’s personal dignity and 
autonomy, he also addressed directly the fact that while a particular sexual activity or 
inclination may seem undignified, it should not compromise one’s personal dignity,92 
and to take away that dignity strikes at the core of Mosley’s personality.93 He ruled 
accordingly that damages awarded should compensate for one’s distress, hurt feelings 
and loss of dignity. If we had actually stopped reading the judgment at this point, we 
might have thought Mosley was going to win a full legal victory. Yet, it was at this 
stage of considering the award of damages that Justice Eady suddenly decided to slip 
back into defamation law analysis. 
On substantive law, Justice Eady clarified that a privacy claim is not directly 
concerned with compensating for, or vindicating, injury to reputation.
94
 As a result, on 
calculating the damages to be awarded, he drew analogy to the award criteria under 
defamation law and personal injury actions, which might well be justified.
95
 But 
midway in his analysis, he suddenly changed his tone. First he agreed there was no 
doctrine of contributory negligence in this area of privacy invasion but then he ruled 
that the extent to which Mosley had ‘contributed to the nature and scale of the distress 
might be a relevant factor on causation.’96 Following this, he raised the question of 
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whether Mosley had ‘put himself in a predicament by his own choice which 
contributed to his distress and loss of dignity? To what extent is he the author of his 
own misfortune?’97 Justice Eady then commented on Mosley’s behaviour as ‘reckless 
and almost self-destructive.’98 In his opinion, although this would not excuse the 
intrusion into the defendant’s privacy,  
[it] ‘might be a relevant factor to take into account when assessing causal 
responsibility for what happened. It could be thought unreasonable to absolve 
him of all responsibility for placing himself and his family in the predicament in 
which they now find themselves. It is part and parcel of human dignity that one 
must take at least some responsibility for one’s own actions.’99 
 So, on the one hand, Justice Eady ruled that one’s sexual taste, preference and 
activities in private are not for anyone to judge, and should warrant the protection of 
privacy law based on the notion of dignity. On the other hand, he himself was passing 
judgment onto the plaintiff, and in ruling that the plaintiff should not be granted full 
compensation for privacy invasion because he had not proven himself entirely worthy 
of dignity protection. This is contradictory to our previous analysis on innate dignity 
right. 
Consequently, in both Campbell and Mosley, we find that some English judges 
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have confused the concept of innate dignity with the notion of reputation. Plaintiffs 
have to prove their own worthiness, as if they have to come to the court with clean 
hands in equitable actions. Moreover, the failure to appreciate and to articulate dignity 
interests, and to understand its relations with privacy protection has compromised 
unfairly the rights of the claimants. Taking the facts in the two cases discussed, other 
than the nature of the activities, the claimants had only been involved either alone or 
with other consenting adults. As such, the courts should have emphasized that the 
principal values behind privacy rights is the protection of individual autonomy in the 
pursuit of self-realization and innate dignity. The misuse of information was based on 
the violations to private, intimate, intense and sensitive subjective feelings,
100
 and on 
activities that had not interfered with the interest of a third party. Also, the 
unauthorized disclosure and wide dissemination of the information, especially in the 
form of images, was particularly intrusive. The additional fact that both parties might 
be perceived to be insincere and had misled the public in this regard would not be 
sufficient grounds of justification because the media’s methods of revealing the so 
called-truth would constitute public shaming and massive character attacks in holding 
the claimants to ridicule, severe embarrassment or contempt. The intensity had 
reached such a level that their self-esteem, self-respect and innate dignity were 
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tarnished. The devastating impact on Mosley, is well illustrated by the continuing 
wide circulation of the sexual images and video in cyberspace even at the time of 
writing. Worse, there is no way of stopping them. In the words of Justice Eady, it is 
‘hardly exaggerating when [Mosley] says that his life was ruined.’101    
 
C.  European Court of Human Rights: Reputation, Honour and Dignity 
Until we can identify the core values behind privacy protection, including the 
entitlement to dignity as one’s self-respect and innate value, we will be continually 
challenged by the legal conundrum of privacy rights. To a certain extent, this is 
understandable or even forgivable. While Article 17 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights,
102
 and Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,
103
 have mentioned the protection of one’s honour and reputation 
under privacy right, Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights only 
states that ‘everyone has the right of respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence.’ Despite this rather brief elucidation of the content 
of privacy rights, the jurisprudence which emerged from the Council of Europe and 
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the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is rich. Back in 1970, the Council of 
Europe had already defined the right to privacy to be  
‘the right to live one’s own life with a minimum of interference. It concerns 
private, family and home life, physical and moral integrity, honour and 
reputation, avoidance of being placed in a false light, non-revelation of irrelevant 
and embarrassing facts, unauthorized publication of private photographs, 
protection from disclosure of information given or received by individual 
confidentiality.’104 
 
The high watermark on privacy protection from the ECtHR came in Von Hannover v. 
Germany, concerning Princess Caroline of Monaco asserting her privacy rights 
against the tabloid media.
105
 The Court unanimously stood by the Princess on the 
ground that the protection of private life includes not only aspects relating to one’s 
personal identity, name and photograph, but also one’s physical and psychological 
integrity.
106
 The Court’s protection is intended to ‘ensure the development, without 
outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with other 
human beings … even in a public context.’107 To subject the Princess to the camera’s 
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lens at almost any time, with the resulting images being widely disseminated to a 
broad section of the public, was detrimental to the development of her personality as a 
human being.  
While the contours of the right to private life which touch on various aspects of 
an individual’s development are gradually becoming clearer, the growing 
jurisprudence elaborating on the relationship between reputation, honour and dignity 
under the right to private life has remained blurred.
108
  
In defamation cases, the debate is about whether attacks on one’s reputation 
based on false statements has violated one’s right to a private life. This position was 
elucidated in Karako v Hungary,
109
 in which the ECtHR made a clear distinction 
between reputation and personal integrity, and ruled that both could come under the 
umbrella of the right to private life. The applicant in Karako was criticized by the 
media of compromising the interests of his own electoral district when he was a 
candidate. He brought an action in libel and argued there was a violation of Article 8. 
The Court considered that the protection to reputation could come under Article 10(2) 
of the Convention which has provided a ground for the restriction of freedom of 
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expression,
110
 and could also come under protection of private life under Article 8.
111
 
In addition, in the Court’s opinion, the right to personal integrity which is part of 
privacy right is covered by the concept of ‘the rights of others,’ and provides a 
justified ground to restrict freedom of expression under Article 10(2).
112
 
The Court acknowledged that the protection of reputation ‘has traditionally been 
protected by the law of defamation as a matter related primarily to financial interests 
or social status.’113 Yet, in order for reputation to fall also within the ambit of privacy 
right, the Court ruled that the factual allegations must be ‘of such a seriously 
offensive nature that [the] publication had an inevitable direct effect on the applicant’s 
private life.’114 It is on this ground that the Court finally concluded that the right to 
private life of the applicant had not been breached because he had not shown that ‘the 
publication in question, allegedly affecting his reputation, constituted such a serious 
interference with his private life as to undermine his personal integrity.’115 Directly on 
the distinction between reputation and personal integrity, the Court explained –  
‘personal integrity rights falling within the ambit of Article 8 are unrelated to the 
external evaluation of the individual, whereas in matters of reputation, that 
                                                        
110
 Ibid, para. 24. Article 10 provides that ‘‘1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression…2. The 
exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of …the protection of the reputation or rights of others…’’ 
111
 Ibid, para. 23 and 25. 
112
 Ibid, para. 25. 
113
 Ibid, para. 22. 
114
 Ibid, para. 23. 
115
 Ibid. 
31 
 
evaluation is decisive: one may lose the esteem of society – perhaps rightly so – 
but not one’s integrity, which remains inalienable.’116  
Analyzing the above quote from our previous discussion, the Court’s analysis on 
personal integrity is in fact referring to the innate dignity of an individual.  
 In contrast to the recognition and development of reputation as part of privacy 
right in defamation lawsuits, privacy right is also invoked when one faces attacks of 
true allegations. This was addressed in Sidabras and Dziatuas v. Lithuania and A v. 
Norway.
117
 
The first case concerned two former KGB officers who had faced discrimination 
having been barred from engaging in professional activities in various areas of the 
private sector following the implementation of the local KGB Act after the downfall 
of the Soviet Union. They had been dismissed from their jobs as tax inspector and 
prosecutor respectively. Their claim concerned the negative publicity caused by the 
KGB Act. They had suffered constant embarrassment because of past history, as a 
result of which they had great difficulty in finding jobs.
118
 
Since the ECtHR had ruled that there had been violation of the anti-
discrimination principle under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, it held 
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that it was unnecessary to rule whether there had been violation of Article 8 alone. 
Nevertheless, the Court had elaborated on the meaning and application of Article 8 to 
the specific case. First, it reiterated that the right to private life is ‘a broad term not 
susceptible to exhaustive definition.’119 But it is established that it includes one’s right 
to live privately, away from unwanted attention, to pursue freely the development and 
fulfillment of one’s personality, and to establish and develop relationships with 
others.
120
 Second, in applying the interpretation of private life to the case at bar, the 
Court noted that the applicants had been ‘marked in the eyes of society on account of 
their past association with an oppressive regime.’121 The constant embarrassment and 
the continued burden that they had to face amounted to ‘possible impediment to their 
leading a normal personal life,’ which are relevant factors to be taken into account in 
the consideration of Article 8 violations.
122
 In the reasoning, the Court made it clear 
that Article 8 could not be invoked by the applicants to protect reputation for the loss 
was foreseeable.
123
 Following this logic, the likely consequence that we can deduce is 
that the ECtHR would reach the conclusion that Article 8, on its own, had been 
violated. 
In the second case of A v Norway, the claimant was a convicted murderer, and a 
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substance abuser with an underdeveloped mental capacity. Shortly after he had served 
his prison term, a horrific murder took place involving the rape of two young girls in 
the same area where he had lived. During that period, the claimant was living in his 
family’s cabin and had been working on a rehabilitation scheme. Because of the 
murder of the young girls, he was interrogated by the police. Not only had the murder 
attracted much media attention, but the claimant’s interrogation by the police and his 
background were also reported in three national newspapers and a TV station. In one 
national television broadcast, the news broadcast stated that ‘possibly the most special 
candidate of these persons (former convicted…) is precisely this 42-year old.’124 
Though the claimant was not named, he was filmed from behind and partly from the 
side. His place of residence and his past history were also revealed. He was the only 
candidate featured in that story. Other newspapers had published information about 
his work place, photos of him going to work, and going home.
125
 Eventually, two 
young men were later arrested and convicted of the murder. But the claimant’s life 
had been severely disrupted - he was dismissed from his job, and forced into 
relocation in an isolated place. Because of all this, he suffered from serious 
psychological problems.
126
 As a last resort, he brought an action in defamation before 
the local courts but was unsuccessful, so he appealed to the ECtHR for violation of his 
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right to protection of reputation under Article 8 of the European Convention. 
The case was vexed with difficulty, partly because the murder of the young girls 
was of legitimate and serious public interest, and partly due to the fact that what the 
media had disclosed was largely based on true facts. Yet none of the media had 
mentioned the name of the claimant, or stated that he was a suspect.  One even printed 
the claimant’s claim of innocence stated in an interview.127 
Despite the legal intricacies, the ECtHR framed the case as an issue of protection 
of honour and reputation and as part of the right to respect for private life. At the 
outset of the analysis, the Court reminded us that, before Article 8 could come into 
play, ‘the attack on personal honour and reputation must attain a certain level of 
gravity and in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to 
respect for private life’.128 The fact that the applicant had not been mentioned by name 
was not considered by the Court to be a decisive factor, because the Court pointed out 
that the photographs and details of his work and residence had made it possible for all 
those who knew him to identify him with a crime particularly reprehensible and 
sensitive. Furthermore, the court ruled that though the media had reported largely 
factual information about the investigation ‘the way it was presented wrongly 
conveyed the impression that there was a factual basis justifying the view that the 
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applicant could be considered as a possible suspect.’129 Finally, the Court did not 
consider that the serious public interest could justify the defamatory allegation against 
the claimant with consequent harm done to him. The Court described the claimant as 
‘persecuted by journalists against whom he found it difficult to protect himself.’130 He 
was in a critical phase of rehabilitation and social reintegration after serving his prison 
sentence but was ‘driven into social exclusion’ by the media.131 What the publication 
had done was a ‘particularly grievous prejudice’ against a person’s honour and 
reputation that was ‘especially harmful to his moral and psychological integrity and to 
his private life.’132 
The reasoning of A v. Norway has provided valuable insight for our present study 
on online shaming because the ECtHR ruled that literally true statements, conveying 
false implications, could amount to defamation. And the way of media coverage could 
amount to a form of persecution if causing serious disruption and interference to the 
victim’s private life. Yet, what is left unclear is that the Court has not elaborated in 
detail whether there is any distinction between honour and reputation in the protection 
of the right to private life. Do both concepts refer to estimation in the minds of third 
parties? Or did the European Court use the term ‘honour’ to refer to one’s inherent 
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dignity, while ‘reputation’ refers to the estimation is in the minds of third parties?  
Scholars have provided insightful guidance on this issue. Manfred Nowak argues 
that although there is overlapping between honour and reputation, they are different in 
nature.
133
 Prima facie, both terms are related to the ‘conformity of a person’s conduct 
with the moral or social requirements’ of society.134  However, on a careful look, 
Nowak observes that honour ‘tends to give expression more to this person’s subjective 
opinion of himself or herself (subjective feeling of honour).’135 Hence, attack on a 
person’s honour is a condemnation of the moral character of a person, and an 
impairment to a person’s self-esteem that interferes severely with one’s ‘dignity, 
integrity and privacy than the mere injury to reputation.’136 Furthermore, a ‘massive 
attack’ on one’s honour may constitute a form of degrading treatment and may 
amount to a violation of the right to respect for dignity.
137
 By comparison, Nowak 
further explains that reputation is about the appraisal of one by others. It can only be 
harmed by an attack accessible to the public.
138
 
This view is supported by David Feldman, who further analyzes the distinction 
between honour and reputation, and their relation to dignity. He writes, ‘honour and 
reputation together are akin to dignity in allowing one to develop a flourishing social 
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and business life, and honour is a particularly significant contributor to the self-
respect and dignity which form a major part of one’s view of oneself.’139 While the 
legal action of libel will protect one’s reputation from false allegation, the protection 
of one’s dignity is not dependent on the truth or falsity of the statement. Feldman 
considers that ‘unrestrained publication of unpleasant personal truths’ has a definite 
impact on private life, self-respect and public order, which rightly explains why Lord 
Mansfield once said ‘The greater the truth, the greater the libel.’ 140  He further 
suggests that, unless there is strong public interest to disclose, there should be legal 
remedies for the harm done to reputation, dignity and self-respect by publication of 
true information where an aspect of a person’s private life is likely to be held up to 
ridicule or contempt because he should be entitled to protect his dignity, including 
both ‘self-respect and the esteem of others, from assault on the basis of activities 
which are nobody else’s business.’141 
In our discussion, what Nowak and Feldman describe as ‘honour’ is in fact 
innate dignity. Both of them refer to honour as self-esteem, related to one’s subjective 
self. Assaults on it are unjustified regardless of whether the attacks are based on true 
facts or falsity. 
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III. Freedom of Expression 
        The protection of people’s privacy based on autonomy and dignity, and of respect 
as qua persona, may make us wonder whether these above propositions would place 
undue restraint on freedom of expression. While it is beyond the scope of this article 
to draw the exact dividing line between right to privacy and freedom of expression, 
suffice is it to say that privacy right is never absolute, neither is freedom of expression. 
Specifically, privacy should yield to freedom of expression when overriding public 
interest is at stake, namely when life threatening or unlawful behaviour has taken 
place. For instance, in 2001, US police abuse of power in an incident concerning a 
black taxi-driver, Rodney King, was rightly filmed and exposed by private citizens.
142
 
In 2011, in China, the son of a senior official hit two university students on campus 
with his car. It was alleged the young man attempted to flee and bragged to the crowd 
present that his father was Li Gang, the deputy police chief of that region. The 
incident was reported on the Internet by netizens who were determined to bring the 
young man to justice. At the end, he was sentenced to six years of imprisonment for 
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manslaughter.
143
 Netizens in China are known to use the Internet to expose the corrupt 
and immoral behaviour of officials so as to bring about their downfall.
144
  
Yet having conceded that public interest and freedom of expression should 
prevail under certain situations (for instance when serious crime is being committed 
or when abuse of power by officials is involved) is not equivalent to endorsing the 
practice of hunting down perceived wrongdoers, exposing their personal details, 
harassing them or administrating justice as one’s wish. It is entirely disproportionate 
to the aim of revealing and correcting social wrongs. And there is no public interest to 
be served in making a vicious attack on an individual which is likely to threaten his 
life and security in reality. What we have to guard against is the abuse of freedom of 
expression on a public interest matter which becomes a form of online violence, 
spilling into threats in real life. 
 
Conclusion 
It was Marshall McLuhan, writing in the 1960s on the phenomenon of electronic 
media, who already had foretold that we would live in a state of ‘new electronic 
interdependence’ in a ‘global village.’145 To him, the speed of this electronic media 
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would wire us up to act and react to global issues instantaneously, continuously and 
collectively.
146
 McLuhan warned us that the global village has every potential to 
become a place where totalitarianism and terror may rule due to the sacrifice of 
individualism and lack of in-depth reflection.
147
 He left us with a piece of advice, 
asking us to be vigilant towards the dynamic that technology would bring and to the 
impact of the influence of the media on our social interaction, lest we would find 
ourselves locked ‘in a small world of tribal drums, total interdependence, and 
superimposed co-existence.’ 148   
Sadly, McLuhan’s prophesy holds true for the 21st century cyber global village 
because we have seen that the Internet is replete with examples of those tribal drums 
in the form of online shaming. New information communication technologies have 
led to an increasing popularity and fascination with capturing others’ images, 
exposing others’ wrongdoing, and bringing the people concerned to a brand of online 
justice in the form of a manhunt which, in both the cyber and real world, can easily 
and quickly spin out of control, often descending into various forms of shaming, 
humiliation, character assault, and even harassment. Hence, a distorted form of 
freedom of expression is enjoyed by an anonymous online mob at serious heavy cost 
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to the dignity of others, a core element of one’s privacy. As a result, this practice of 
online shaming has raised unanswerable ethical and legal questions. In our attempt to 
search for legal guidance from the European Court of Human Rights, we have noticed 
an emerging jurisprudence on the recognition of one’s innate dignity and its relation 
with privacy regardless of the wrong of the transgressor-victim. Yet in all those cases, 
the defendants could be clearly identified, while the perpetrators of online shaming 
are likely to be an anonymous crowd from different jurisdictions. Indeed, another 
research project would be necessary to do justice to the issues of accountability and 
responsibility but it is hoped, at least, that this article has laid the ground work for the 
recognition of a legal right to privacy, based on the right to dignity. 
Dignity has been described vividly by Reaume as a guardian angel hovering over 
our laws.
149
 It is, perhaps, time now to call upon our legal guardians for protection in 
favour of a proper responsible participation in the E-village. 
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